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Abstract-In this paper, we analyze the influence of forward 
trading on the volatility of spot power prices, in models where 
forward contracts are strategic tools used by energy producers to 
obtain profit security. We define volatility as the variance of the 
percentage change in spot power prices over a given time 
interval. As shown in Sapio (2008), volatility is related to 
stochastic fluctuations in preference and technology 
fundamentals, and is tuned by the price-elasticity of demand and 
supply, evaluated at equilibrium. 
We study two cases. First, we analyze the volatility 
implications of a model wherein the amount of forward trading is 
fixed, and producers compete a la Cournot. Fixed forward 
trading increases spot volatility, because forwards lower the spot 
price level, corresponding to a less elastic region of a linear 
demand function. However, if the amount of forward trading is 
endogenous, as in the two-stage model of Allaz (1992), producers 
can anticipate the spot market impact of stochastic shocks on 
fundamentals and ``sterilize'' them. As a result, spot price 
volatility is closer to the value implied by an efficient market. 
Our theoretical results are illustrated by means of a simple 
simulation study. 
 
                                                         
 
I.  NOMENCLATURE 
 
t: time index 
a(t): maximum reservation price for electricity use 
(intercept of the demand function) 
c(t): marginal cost of electricity generation 
p(t): spot electricity price 
q(t): spot electricity trading volume 
n: number of electricity producers 
F(t): forward electricity trading volume (sum over firms) 
E[•|t-1]: conditional expected value operator 











≡ ξ : elasticity of the spot price with 














t ≡ γ : growth rate of c(t), i.i.d. 
.
) (t x : the time derivative of the generic function  ) (t x . 
Spot volatility: the square root of the variance of the spot 
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price growth rate over a given time interval. 
 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
n recent years, the traditional regulatory framework for the 
wholesale electricity industry has been replaced in many 
countries by market competition. Electricity producers 
compete through both spot market bidding and forward 
trading. Albeit electricity users and producers are faced with 
extremely high risk (Eydeland and Wolyniec 2003, Geman 
2005, Weron 2000, Weron 2006), hedging is not the only 
reason for the existence of forward markets (Allaz 1992). 
Forward contracts can be used by power suppliers 
strategically, in order to increase their spot market share. But 
if suppliers are allowed to trade forward, they can use 
information more efficiently, and once their forward market 
commitments are signed, they are ready to compete more 
aggressively on the spot market, enhancing competition. In 
turn, greater spot competition is believed to decrease the 
likelihood of spikes and to yield lower spot volatility.  
In this paper, we reappraise the spot volatility impact of 
forward trading, based on a simple insight. Lower spot prices 
induced by forward trading may correspond to a less elastic 
region of the demand function –e.g. when demand is linear – 
possibly leading to higher spot volatility. Moreover, low 
volatility may be achieved even in tightly oligopolistic 
markets without forward trading, if markups are kept rather 
stable.  
We analyze the impact of forward trading on spot volatility 
in a Cournot oligopoly, comparing two cases: fixed and 
endogenous forward coverage. Our analysis builds on the 
paper by Allaz (1992).  
 A forward contract is an agreement between two parties to 
buy or sell an asset at a pre-agreed future instant of time. 
Therefore, the trade date and delivery date are separated. They 
are used to control and hedge the market risk. If the 
transaction is collaterised, exchange of margin will take place 
according to a pre-agreed rule or schedule. Otherwise no asset 
of any kind actually changes hands, until the maturity of the 
contract. The forward price of such a contract is commonly 
contrasted with the spot price. The difference between the spot 
and the contract price is the contract premium or contract 
discount  (Borgosz-Koczwara et al. 2007). 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section III the spot 
volatility in models with fixed and endogenous and forward 
trading is analyzed. The results are illustrated by means of a 
simulation study.  
III.  MODELS WITH FORWARD TRADING 
A.  Fixed forward trading 
The following analysis assumes symmetric Cournot 
competition in the spot electricity market, and lets the amount 
of forward contracts purchased by each of the n firms be fixed, 
or exogenously given, at the level f for individual firms, and at 
the market-wide level F = n f ≥ 0 (see Niu, Baldick and Zhu 
2005). Firms face an affine inverse demand function 
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Here, we assume that reservation prices, as measured by the 
intercept a(t), change over time, in response to events such as 
changes in weather, random shocks to preferences, and so 
forth. Conversely, we assume away any time variation in the 
slope of the demand function. Thus, for the sake of notational 
parsimony, we set the slope to 1. 
Power generation companies are characterized by a linear 
cost function C(t) = c(t)q(t), where c(t) denotes the marginal 
cost of energy production, which is assumed constant across 
production levels, but variable over time. Indeed, this 
parameter captures the level of fuel costs, which fluctuate over 
time. Also, random shocks to the efficiency of power plants 
can give rise to fluctuations in c(t) (see also the Nomenclature 
section at the beginning of the paper). 
Firms choose their output so as to maximize profits: 
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where Ais the forward price. Taking account of all 
individual supply decisions, the expression for aggregate 
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As in Sapio (2008), the variance of spot price rates of 
change reads 
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Eq. (4) shows how the spot volatility depends on the volatility 
of fundamental drivers. Notice that, as n goes to infinity, the 
former (5) goes to zero and the latter (6) to 1. Hence, the spot 
price volatility approaches the volatility of marginal costs in a 
perfectly competitive market. 
  
I  
B.  Endogenous forward trading 
The reference model here is Allaz (1992), slightly extended 
to allow for uncertainty in marginal costs, in addition to the 
assumption of a random demand intercept as in the original 
model. We focus on the risk-neutral, Cournot conjectural 
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This result is obtained by substituting the expression for the 
amount of forward trading  
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under the assumption that producers are able to correctly 
guess the values of demand and cost parameters, using the 
information available up to time t-1: 
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with x(t) equal to either a(t) or c(t). Eq. (7) implies that the 
spot volatility under endogenous choice of forward coverage,   
)] ( /
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Here too, as n goes to infinity, the former elasticity (11) 
goes to zero, whereas the latter (12) goes to 1. Though, the 
volatility of spot prices with endogenous forward trading 
converges to the volatility of marginal costs faster than with 
fixed forwards, due to the terms in n squared.  
 
C.  The spot volatility impact of forward trading 
As shown, the spot volatility does vary depending on 
whether forward coverage is fixed or endogenously 
determined, because the spot price responds in different ways 
to perturbations in cost and demand parameters. The 
information included in the previous sections can be useful in 
two respects. First, the results from the fixed forward model 
allow to study whether increasing the forward trading volume 
as such mitigates spot volatility. However, even beyond the 
impact of the sheer amount of forward trading, introducing 
forward contracts changes the behavior of electricity suppliers. 
As illustrated by the Allaz model, power producers can make 
strategic use of forward contracts, in order to improve their 
profit levels. Hence, a second goal of the analysis is to explore 
the issue of whether spot volatility is affected by the 
sequential strategies of electricity producers who trade both 
spot and forward. We pursue this goal by comparing the spot 
volatilities implied by fixed and endogenous forward trading 
models.  
The relationship between spot volatility and the amount of 
forward trading is illustrated by (5) and (6), together with (4). 
Note that, because elasticities in (5) and (6) are increasing in 
F, forward trading increases the spot volatility by making the 
spot price more sensitive to fluctuations in both cost and 
demand parameters. This is because forwards lower the spot 
price level, corresponding to a less elastic region of the 
demand function, which is assumed linear. On these grounds, 
we conclude that if forward trading is fixed, then greater 
forward coverage increases spot volatility. 
If the amount of forward trading is not fixed, suppliers can 
choose forward coverage strategically. To understand the 
impact of this, we wonder whether spot electricity markets 
with endogenous forward coverage are less volatile than with  
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(5) and (11) if n > 1. 
The threshold value is the ratio between two measures of 
relative price responsiveness. At the numerator, there is the 
difference between how responsive is price to marginal costs 
in the endogenous forwards case, and how responsive it is 
under the fixed forwards case. These responsiveness indicators 
are both increasing in n, because spot prices in a more 
competitive market provide more information on the 
underlying marginal costs, and therefore respond more to cost 
fluctuations. The former increases faster with n (compare (6) 
and (12)).   
At the denominator, there appears the relative 
responsiveness of price to the demand variable a, under fixed 
and endogenous forward trading.  Both are decreasing with n – 
i.e. higher when there is market power, because demand 
parameters enter the markups charged by suppliers. The latter 
decreases with n faster (compare (5) and (11)). 
Condition (13) states that endogenous forward trading 
mitigates volatility more than fixed forward coverage, if the 
volatility of demand variables is greater than the volatility of 
marginal costs, according to a threshold value, dictated by the 
relative responsiveness of the price to the underlying demand 
and cost drivers.  
 
Because price is more or less responsive to cost fluctuations 
depending on market power, it can be useful to assess how the 
impact of strategic trading on spot volatility is tuned by the 
strength of oligopolistic interactions and market power, which 
are inversely related to n. We thus study the behavior of Г 
with respect to the number of firms, n, all else being given, to 
answer the question: is the volatility impact of endogenous 
forward trading different under different degrees of market 
competition? 
 
Intuitively, as the market approaches perfect competition 
(n→∞), the spot price p(t) tends to the value of marginal costs 
c(t), and accordingly, the spot price volatility tends to the 
volatility of production costs, V[γ(t)]. When producers are 
endowed with market power, instead, the spot price 
fluctuations depend also on the dynamics in the demand 
intercept a(t), in that decision-making by suppliers needs to 
incorporate information regarding how users would respond to 
price policies. Barring perfect competition, the spot volatility 
typically lies between the volatility of demand and cost 
parameters; see also (4). Therefore, the spot market volatility 
can converge to the competitive value from “below” or from 
“above” as n→∞, depending on whether V[α(t)] or V[γ(t)] is 
larger. In markets with very stable production costs and noisy 
demand, competition drives volatility down. The opposite 
holds when demand is stable and costs vary wildly.  
This given, the impact of endogenous forward trading vis-
à-vis fixed forwards can be understood by noting that, as 
indicated in sections III.A and III.B, the spot volatility 
converges faster to the volatility of marginal costs with 
strategically-driven forward coverage. Hence, as n increases, 
endogenous forwards boost volatility more if V[γ(t)]  is 
relatively large, but mitigate it more if V[γ(t)] is relatively 
small. One way or the other, the volatility value under 
endogenous forwards is closer to what is implied by an 
efficient market, than under fixed forwards, for all values of n. 
This is consistent with the idea that, if suppliers are allowed to 
choose the amount of forward coverage, as in the Allaz model, 
they can use information more efficiently. However, the 
volatility implied by a competitive market might be very large, 
if marginal costs are very noisy. 
To formally assess this intuition, let us study how the 
threshold Г with respect to the number of firms n.  Using (13), 



















< < − = Γ  
 
This means that, if the market is fully concentrated, 
strategically-driven forward transactions are beneficial 
towards spot volatility reduction – consistent with Allaz 
(1992).  
What is the behavior at larger values of n? Suppose 
increasing n causes Г to increase. Then there may exist a value 
n* such that (13) is no longer satisfied for all n > n*. If so, 
allowing for endogenous forward trading in a market which is 
already rather competitive would actually make the spot 
market more volatile. Suppose instead that Г is decreasing in 
n. In such a case, endogenous forward trading is most 
beneficial for volatility, regardless of the degree of market 
competition. The condition (13) is however rather 
cumbersome. This is why we resort to a simulation 
methodology, as in the following section.  
D.  A simulation study 
In order to illustrate the theoretical results obtained in the 
previous sections, we consider the symmetric Cournot 
competition in the spot electricity market with fixed and 
endogenous forward trading. By means of simulations, we 
illustrate the behavior of spot volatility and the Г coefficient 
with respect to n.   
In our simulation study, we assume the sequences  α(t) and 
γ(t) are i.i.d. random variables with standard normal 
distribution mutually independent. In this case the sequences 
a(t) and c(t) are independent random walks given by 
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In Fig. 1 we illustrate the prices p(t) for three values of n in 
case of fixed forward trading (top panel) as well as the 
endogenous forward trading (bottom panel). Moreover, on 
both panels the star lines represent the sequence c(t). It is 
worth pointing out that for a larger number of suppliers, the 
price tends to the marginal cost.  
  























Fig.1. The prices p(t) for different values of n. On both panels the star lines 
represent the sequence c(t). 
 
 
In Fig. 2, 3 and 4 we show the behavior of spot price volatility  
for different numbers of suppliers in the two cases under 
consideration. 


















Fig.2. The volatility of spot price for n=1. 
 


















Fig.3. The volatility of spot price for n=2. 
 
 


















Fig.4. The volatility of spot price for n=10. 
 
As we see, for n=1 (the monopoly case) the volatility of spot 
prices in case of fixed forward trading exceeds the volatility in 
the endogenous forward case. This confirms the theoretical 
result obtained in section III.C. No clear ranking emerges 
between the fixed and the endogenous cases when n=2, 
whereas  n=10 implies that strategically-driven forward 
transactions make the spot market relatively more unstable.  
  


















Fig.5. The Г coefficient for different values of n.  
 
 
In Fig. 5 we illustrate how the n parameter influences on the Г 
coefficient. As before, we consider three values: n=1, 2 and 
10. The Г coefficient increases with respect to the number of 
suppliers, therefore the inequality given in (13) is less likely to 
hold for larger value of n. Thus, the parametrization used here 
(i.e. the given values of V[α(t)] and V[γ(t)]) implies that 
strategically-driven forward trading when the market is 
already rather competitive can magnify volatility. However, 
had we chosen smaller values of V[γ(t)] and larger values of 
V[α(t)], introducing endogenous forward trading would 
actually reduce volatility.  
The key is that endogenous forward trading pushes the price 
volatility closer to the volatility of marginal costs. But this 
may not be good news for the market, if marginal costs 
experience wide fluctuations.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We have evaluated the price volatility in the Cournot model 
with fixed and endogenous forward trading, when suppliers 
use derivatives as components of their bidding strategies.  
As we see in the theoretical analysis as well as in the 
simulation study, the considered forward contracts influence 
significantly the volatility. Moreover, the impact is tuned by 
the number of suppliers in the industry. Comparing the cases 
with fixed and endogenous forward coverage, one can observe 
that the price volatility may be magnified by endogenous 
forward trading in a symmetric Cournot model with linear 
demand: the reason is that forward trading pushes spot prices 
closer to marginal costs, corresponding to a less elastic region 
of the demand function.   
We plan to extend our analysis to more realistic models, 
such as the Supply Function Equilibrium model. Indeed, the 
Cournot model is a simplification of the actual decision-
making by power suppliers - whose strategies concern price-
quantity pairs. The works by Newbery (1998), Green (1999), 
and Borgosz-Koczwara and Wylomanska (2007) shall be the 
most useful starting points in that respect. 
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